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Of Turkey, Russia and Elsewhere
Transfaires and Empire1
Olivier Bouquet
Translation : Nora Scott
 
Update on trans-acting matters
1 On 1 December 2014, V. Putin was driven in an armored limousine to the president’s
palace  in  Ankara,  where  R.T.  Erdoğan  gave  him  the  grand  tour  of  the  huge  neo-
Ottoman building. Comprising over 1000 rooms, the White Palace has been dubbed “Ak
Saray” by both the press and the opposition. Differences of opinion between the two
heads of state were vigorous and many (from the occupation of Crimea to the Syrian
issue). But potential conflicts were tempered by shared interests (in particular energy
cooperation) and the rejection of a Western domination denounced by both parties. On
23 September 2015, it was R.T. Erdoğan’s turn to pay a visit to his Russian counterpart.
In Moscow, he joined Mahmud Abbas in inaugurating an imposing mosque (46m high
with a dome 27m in diameter and costing $170 m). It is the largest mosque in a city
counting no fewer than two million Muslims.  The mosque stands on the site  of  an
earlier building demolished in 2011 by (a particularly controversial)  decision of the
Russian  religious  authorities.  In  their  respective  speeches,  Putin  and  Erdoğan
articulated the issues of cultural cooperation, protection of Islam and the struggle for
peace. For Putin, this meant fighting terrorism – on the part of DAESH, enemy of the
military-backed Syrian regime; while for Erdoğan, it meant the PKK and the threat it
posed to the Turkish state. What was depicted by the press of the countries involved as
the outcome of a Eurasian collaboration (Erdoğan used the term “Avrasy”), financially
underpinned  by  several  partnered  Muslim  countries  or  governments  (Turkey,
Kazakhstan,  the  Palestinian  Authority),  refers  to  interlacing  “trans-actions”,
“transfaires” in the French literature, which we will for the time being define as the
“technical  and  symbolic  instruments  produced  and  reproduced  by  circulation”
involved  in  “processes  of  the  translation  and  co-production  of  the  normative  and
material vectors of political action” (Transfaire 2012)
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The cathedral-mosque of Moscow, old and new versions
“Historical Moscow Cathedral Mosque to Re-open”, Islamic Voice, 15 September 2015 ( http://
islamicvoice.com/historical-moscow-cathedral-mosque-to-re-open/); “ISIL’s ideology is based on lies
and perversion of Islam, says Putin”, Ecumenical News, 23 September 2015 (URL : http://
www.ecumenicalnews.com/article/isils-ideology-is-based-on-lies-and-perversion-of-islam-says-
putin-34001; consulted 15 October 2015).
2 Unpacking this example: a mosque built in 1904 with the aid of a Tatar philanthropist-
merchant,  Salikh  Yerzin,  was  replaced  by  an  edifice  financed  in  part  by  Süleyman
Kerimov, a Lezghian oligarch whose wealth stems from an energy resource at the heart
of a Russian-Turkish strategic relationship: natural gas. This is a multi-facetted trans-
action, or “transfaire”. First of all, it can be seen as a trans-action involving a religious
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space: by its very name, the new “cathedral mosque” symbolizes the recruitment of
Orthodox religious ideology in the defense of a Russian Islam subservient to the State
and the installation of the Islamic community in Moscow’s urban space: like the ulu
camii (“great mosque” in Turkish), the “sobornaia metchet” (Джума-мечеть; араб. al-
jumʿa — собрание al-masjid — мечеть)  subsumes  the  notions  of  centrality  and
community.2 Secondly,  it  is  an  architectural  trans-action:  in  the  place  of  a  neo-
Byzantine building (Figure 1, top) now stands an “architectural mishmash”, to quote
one American observer (MacFarquhar 2015), composed of gray-green Canadian marble,
elements borrowed from the Turkish Islamic tradition, Russian ornamental references,
a minaret modeled on a Kremlin tower, while it is topped with a golden dome in tribute
to those found on several Moscow churches (Figure 1, bottom). Thirdly, an institutional
trans-action:  a mosque built  in the context of  a Czarist  Russian policy of  unilateral
domination of the Tatar minorities, in continuation of Catherine the Great’s project for
the institutionalization of the Muslim religion, gives way to a mosque constructed in
the context of a religious partnership between Russia and Turkey. In the case of Russia,
this involves the Central Spiritual Administration of the Muslims of Russia – the largest
Russian Muslim organization – and the Russian Council of Muftis. While for Turkey, this
means  the  Directorate  of  Religious  Affairs  and the  General  Directorate  of  Pious
Foundations.  To  place  this  partnership  in  context:  it  follows  on  the  heels  of  the
annexation  of  Crimea,  formerly  populated  by  these  same  minorities.  Fourthly,  a
cultural  trans-action:  In  his  speech,  Putin  wished all  the  Muslims gathered for  the
occasion in front of Europe’s largest mosque an excellent Feast of the Sacrifice. He then
yielded the microphone to his Turkish counterpart, who, wearing a green tie, invoked
the values of Islam and the patronage of Tolstoy. President Erdoğan voiced agreement
with the  Russian author  that  “the  greatest  effort  in  life  is  achieving good”,  before
concluding with a resounding “spasibo” (Hacıoğlu 2015).  This event,  sign of a Post-
Ottoman  globalization  within  not  only  the  Russian  national  territory  but  also  a
Eurasian Muslim religious space,  reveals  the convergence of  several  types of  trans-
actions, comparable to those examined in the present issue, which is itself part of a
broader project that seeks to examine the role of the “Ottoman Turkish world in the
process of scientific and technical globalization” (Transfaire 2014).
Choice of terms
3 Let us examine the terms involved:
4 “World”, not a world-system or a world-economy (Braudel raises the question again in
1980), but a world characterized by what organizes it; what surrounds it (cf. The World
Around It, S. Faroqhi, 2004), by what is included in it, much less than what of itself is
included in what it is not: The Great Turkish Empire was primarily associated with a set
of  valued  products,  carpets  and  other  Turkish  items.  Although the  Sultan  sent  his
emissaries abroad and exported a growing number of raw materials,  as an agent of
globalization,  he  remained  on  the  sidelines.  This  world  has  always  been  open  or
connected:  from  the  earliest  times  of  the  dynasty,  the  Osman  and  Orhan  beys
entertained diplomatic and trade relations with neighboring countries. It was a world
surrounded by seas, some of which were perceived as actual possessions (for Istanbul,
the Black Sea was mare  nostrum),  while others were at  times disputed and at  times
dominated. At the heart of this world was a State which had long imposed either its
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own or at least a characteristic brand of logic: war abroad and taxes at home – both
inspired by the same policy of expansion: the military state was also a fiscal state.
5 This world changed as it shrank in the wake of military defeats and the ensuing loss of
territories. As a result, its relationship to the rest of the world changed as well. In these
circumstances, the Sublime Porte was compelled to accept other (bilateral) diplomatic
approaches: beginning in 1699 with the Treaty of Karlowitz; in 1838 the Treaty of Balta
Limani enacting a free-trade agreement; and then the banking systems, the legal codes,
the arts and techniques. The second half of the 19th century was an era of imperial
whiplash.  Within  the  space  of  a  scant  few  decades,  the  Ottoman  world  became
globalized and fell under the dominion of the West. Historians account for this change
by  compiling  inventories  of  objects  and  symbols  of  modernity.  The  list  includes:
railroads, the piano, gas lighting, double-entry book keeping, and on and on. The great
inventory of borrowings and non-borrowings reflects the pre-occupations of the times:
between the 1970s and today, the Empire is described sometimes as penetrated and
dominated (informal imperialism), sometimes as modernized (developmentalism) and
more recently as connected or globalized (world studies).  The actors are identified:
foreign powers are indicative of the presence of States (the Eastern Question);  then
come the intermediary figures, Levantines and transitional subjects which travel the
in-between space without which there can be no connection.
6 “Ottoman  Turkish”:  or,  as  the  French  sometimes  still,  no  doubt  erroneously,  say:
“Arabo-Muslim”.  An  ethnonym  is  central  to  a  world  and  a  civilization.  But  the
comparison stops there: The Ottoman State is an Islamic State, but many of its subjects
are not Muslim. The term Ottoman Turkish is particular in that it refers to a twofold
tri-partition: Ottoman Turkish, as a language, stands chronologically between medieval
Ural-Altaic Turkish and the Turkish of the Kemalist revolution; Ottoman Turkish as a
modern political  regime is  caught between a medieval  ethnonym (from the Central
Asian Turks to the Great Seljuks) and a contemporary ethnonym (the Turks of Turkey).
In  the  past  twelve  or  so  years,  in  the  wake  of  a  movement  aimed  at  the  re-
Ottomanization  of  both  references  and  symbols,  the  term  “Ottoman  Turkish”  has
undergone a reconfiguration that bears the mark of both nationalism and imperialism
– above we mentioned the “White Palace”. Furthermore, Turkey is increasingly making
its presence felt internationally, well beyond the territorial boundaries defined once
and for all by the 1923 treaty of Lausanne.
7 “Scientific and technical globalization”: in the history of paradigms, the vocabulary of
“globalization” comes at the right time for Ottomanists, advantageously replacing the
theme of westernization, which they had been trying to get rid of for some thirty years.
The substitution was all the more easily made because the framework was partly the
same: globalization is more passive than active, more elitist than socially widespread,
more detrimental than beneficial – in fact few historians stress its contributions (Birdal
2010). It is noteworthy that the notion of globalization has always overshadowed that
of  Europeanization.  For the past  fifty years,  the dominant scientific  production has
come primarily from America. This production has shored up an identified program of
action, namely: economic globalization (Maurel 2009). European authors, on the other
hand, deal primarily with the delicate question of Turkey’s joining the European Union.
Yet in many respects, the globalized Ottoman world was populated by Europeans.
8 From  a  historiographic  standpoint,  Ottoman  globalization  is  discussed  in  terms  of
modernization. It is targeted and pragmatic: The Sultan’s State needed to put an end to
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the cycle of defeats. Sciences and techniques were seen as military weapons – that is
what mattered. Next came tools and equipment, which concerned a broader section of
the population; and finally came the arts and letters. From the mid 19th century, the
sciences were characterized by the diffusion of an ideology of progress. They developed
but  not  all  to  the  same degree:  medicine  more  than biology,  ethnology more  than
geology, sociology more than geography.
 
Historiographic schools
9 We wanted to look at this post-Ottoman world as it relates to another world, to which it
is partially tied. For the time being, we will call it the Russian world, even though it is
broader than this simple designation. Nevertheless, this is the vantage point we will
adopt, that of a French-language historiography based in an institution, the École des
Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales in Paris.  Here until  1995, the Russian world was
assigned  to  the  Centre  d’études  sur  l’URSS,  l’Europe  orientale  et  le  domaine  turc
(Center for Studies on the USSR, Eastern Europe and the Turkish region). At this time,
the Islamic and Ottoman dimensions of the Khanates were only partially covered by
Russian  and  Soviet  historiography,  and  Russian  specialists  worked  alongside
Turkologists.  Together  they  attempted  to  illuminate  the  realities  of  the  countries
bordering the Danube and the Black Sea. Later on, Ottomanists and historians of Russia
began to grow apart: each was struggling with continents of archives updated at the
turn of the century in Moscow and in Istanbul. Nevertheless, they managed to preserve
their dialogue. 
10 When the Cahiers  du  Monde  russe  et  soviétique (Journal of Russian and Soviet Studies)
became the Cahiers du Monde russe (Journal of Russian Studies) in 1993, a subtitle was
added which took in a much broader area including Russia, the Russian Empire, the
Soviet Union and the Commonwealth of Independent States. The expansion indicated
by  the  final  term  marked  the  inauguration  of  an  ambitious  editorial  policy:  The
journal’s Website states that “nearly one third of the articles are devoted to specific
regions of the former URSS – the Caucasus, Central Asia, Tatarstan and Crimea”.3
11 Turkish specialists, on the other hand, bolstered by the reactivation of socio-cultural
solidarities in the post-Soviet era and the popularity of a transnational sociology of
Sufism, redefined the scope of their discipline as a means of expanding their domains
eastward and westward,  which gave  rise  to  the  CETOBaC (Centre  d’études  turques,
ottomanes, balkaniques et centrasiatiques).4 
12 Such remodeling blurred the boundaries between specialties even as it redefined the
specialists themselves. Russian scholars no longer had to devote themselves exclusively
to  Russia,  while  specialists  of  the  Ottoman  Empire  increasingly  dropped  the  term
Turkologist.  This  shift  was  reinforced by  the  fact  that,  in  both  Russia  and Turkey,
historians increasingly recognized specialists of each other’s empire.
13 But Russia was not starting from scratch: for the previous two centuries it had been
recognized as one of  the founders of  Turkic philology.  Beginning with the reign of
Peter the Great (1682-1725), it had developed highly effective programs for teaching
Oriental languages designed for diplomats and translators posted to Turkey and Iran.
From the 1722 translation into  Russian of  Demetrius  Cantemir’s  Latin  System  of   the
Mohammedan Religion to the renaissance of Orientalism in Kazan and Moscow in the first
half  of  the  19th century,  Russian scholars  produced numerous  works  on Turkey,  in
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which they refracted the European vision of the decline of the Ottoman Empire (Taki
2011: 322, 350). The 20th century saw the creation of several chairs of Ottoman history:
important studies on the Arab and Kurdish regions of the Empire appeared ( Kirillina
1999;  Conermann,  Kemper:  2011);  complete  bibliographies  of  printed  sources  were
compiled; the Ottoman manuscripts at the Saint Petersburg Institute of Oriental Studies
and Moscow’s Academy of Sciences were regularly consulted.
14 While  the  Soviet  State  strongly  reduced  its  subventions  to  the  Saint  Petersburg
institution in the late 1980s, it maintained those to the Moscow Academy. There, a new
generation, trained in particular at the Institute of Oriental Studies, took a growing
interest in the Turkish world, the Khanates and in Sufism. Meyer and Zhukov (2014:
126) estimate that the number of historians working on the Ottoman Empire and on
Turkey doubled in  the  space  of  20  years.  Alternatively,  while  the  Moscow archives
(Foreign Policy archives [AVPRI, AVPRF]) and the State Archives of Ancient Documents
(RGADA) opened their doors to specialists from abroad, the Russian scholars working in
them continued to publish in Russian for the most part and were therefore were rarely
read by their non-Russian colleagues (Krillina 1999: 1). At the Congress of the Turkish
History Foundation in 1999, when several historians of the Ottoman Empire presented
the historiographical traditions developed in some fifteen countries, no one spoke for
the Russian school.5 No doubt  this  could be  seen as  the academic  extension of  the
cultural asymmetry between the two countries.
 
Empire: What each was for the other
15 Ottomans  took  only  limited  interest  in  the  culture  of  the  Russian  world:  Ibrahim
Müteferrika was quite alone when, in his 1730 Treatise on Tactics, he urged the Ottomans
to learn from the enemy. Only in 1789 did some statesmen encourage the Sultan to
model his  reforms on those undertaken in Russia.  But such voices remained in the
minority: the  mid-19th-century  chronicler,  Ahmed  Cevdet,  dubbed  Peter  the  Great
“Peter  the  mad”;  at  the  same  time,  in  the  words  of  publicists,  Russians  were
pejoratively  designated  as  “Mocsovites”  (Moskof ;  Aksakal,  Gasimov  2015 :  46 ;  Taki
2011 :  346)  (O.  Bouquet  reviews  the  use  of  these  designations  in  the  case  of
cartography) ; meanwhile the young Ottoman Namık Kemal’s patriotism was steeped in
anti-Russian  sentiment.  Beginning  in  the  1880s,  however,  some  intellectuals  began
looking  at  Russian  poetry  and  literature  with  a  new  eye.  The  Orientalist  Olga
Sergeyevna Lebedeva lent her assistance to the translation projects undertaken by, in
particular,  Mizancı  Murad and Gülnar Hanım. But Sultan Abdülhamid II  (1876-1906)
ordered that works written in Russian be systematically censured and any suspicious
publication burned. Nevertheless, he was obliged to authorize the training of military
officers in the Russian language, and, at the end of the 1880s, the Military Academy
opened courses for this purpose.6 Russian, which was taught in several schools in and
around  Beyoğlu  (in  Heybeliada,  for  instance7),  was  spoken  for  the  most  part  by
Caucasian  refugees,  Armenian  and  Greek  subjects  and  Orthodox  Christians  from
various ethnic backgrounds. With the exception of a few military attachés, Russian was
not widely spoken by the State apparatus: ambassadors in Saint Petersburg used French
in their correspondence. And few Ottomans traveled to the “North” – a region almost
reluctantly discovered by Celâl Nuri (Ö. Türesay). In 1910 and in 1913, Hilmi Pacha and
Mahmud Esad Pacha, respectively, were among the few senior dignitaries to go to Saint
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Petersburg,  Moscow  or  Kazan.  And  even  then,  their  interest  in  things  Russian
concerned primarily the past and future of the Muslim populations (Sibgatullina 2014:
177-218):  they  viewed  the  steppe  and  the  borderlands  as  intellectual  and  practical
buttresses for the effective pan-Islamic or emergent pan-Turanic policies; similarly, in
the  1930s  and1940s,  intellectuals  and  academics  would  approach  the  Central-Asian
region as Turkologists (M. Toutant).
16 In the final years of the Empire, a new impetus spurred the study of Caucasian and
Central-Asian peoples and languages: the new universities recruited numbers of Tatar
scholars and intellectuals from Crimea and Kazan – Azeris and Turkestanis – who had
fled  the  Bolshevik  conquest  of  the  Caucasus  (Ahmet  Caferoğlu,  at  the  heart  of  Z.
Gazimov’s study) and Central Asia (Zeki Velidi Tolan, discussed by M. Toutant). In the
early days of the Republic, a number of Russian-speaking academics figuring among the
1918-19228 waves  of  refugees  contributed not  only  to  development of  new political
sociabilities and practices in the pan-Turkist movement, but also to the activities of
Russian institutions (such as the Archeological Institute created at the end of the 19th
century)  and  to  the  reputation  of  scientific  journals  with  close  ties  to  European
academic  institutions  (Türkiyat  Mecmuası,  Z.  Gasimov).  At  the  same  time,  several
Turkish  scholars  tracked  the  Orientalist  research  produced  by  their  Soviet
counterparts (M. Toutant).
17 In the second half of the 20th century, Slavic studies began to appear in the curricula of
Istanbul’s  and  Ankara’s  literature  departments.  The  universities  of  Hacettepe  and
Bilkent  created  chairs  of  Russian  literature  and  history,  which  were  occupied  by
specialists with rich and varied linguistic profiles. New studies appeared on the history
of Russian Muslims and their settlement in Turkey, and several of these were translated
into the Tatar and Azeri languages. The Prime Minister’s Archives in Istanbul (BOA)
identified and digitized new collections concerning the Khanates.9 A growing number
of theses were devoted to the Russian world – I counted some forty over the last 20
years, half of which make use of primary or secondary sources in Russian.10 
 
Archives
18 Today, the translation of Russian authors, such as Danilevski, continues apace, making
up for lost time. It is hard to imagine that, in 1912, Anna Karenina was translated into
Turkish from the available French version (Aykut 2006:  11).  Even today writings of
communist Russian authors, including Lenin, are translated from the English or French
versions (Aksakal; Gasimov 2015: 58).
19 Cultural transfers have picked up between second- or third-generation Tatar scholars
and academics from Azerbaijan over the past twenty years. For several of these, the
opening of official  archives has not gone un-noticed. Until  the early 1990s,  only an
incomplete list of the collections concerning the Ottoman Empire identified by several
archival centers of the Russian federation were listed in Russian-language guides. In
recent decades, however, a new generation of Turkish historians fluent in Russian has
bravely undertaken inventories of these sources, in particular the military and naval
archives.11 Several young colleagues working in the AVPRI (the Foreign policy archives
of the Russian Empire – closed for the moment) have unearthed maps and sketches
unparalleled in archives of the Ottoman empire; these documents throw valuable light
on technological  development  of  the  Ottoman navy  at  the  end  of  the  18th century
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(Yener 2013: 172-179). At the RGIVA, the same researchers discovered collections that
allow them to enrich the history of military conflicts with precise studies on logistics,
information services and the transfer of prisoners (Kapıcı, Köremezli 2012 : 137-139 ;
Köremezli  2014).  Like  most  foreign  scholars,  they  experience  difficulty  obtaining
photocopies and microfilms, suffer from the closure of several archival collections and,
when it comes to those researching the final years of the Empire and the Republic, find
themselves refused access to the AVRPF. But the preliminary findings of their research
hint at possibilities that would have been unthinkable twenty years ago.
20 Today, a path now lies open for the exchange of ideas between these two schools of
historiography in the process of development or reconfiguration, but the possibilities
for  dialogue  are  restricted.  For  questions  concerning  linguistic  competence  and
consulted archives, Turkey specialists know little about the Russian world, and it seems
to  me  that  the  converse  is  partly  true  as  well.  The  problem  becomes  even  more
complicated  when it  comes  to  the  spaces  in-between,  such as  the  Caucasus,  which
should be considered as a “tri-imperial space, but such is rarely the case (Forestier-
Peyrat 2015: 11). This is not all bad, however: No historian can lay claim to having an
authoritative argument they might use in their national specialty.  The problem has
often been posed: “A researcher trained in France undertaking research on a Franco-
German subject cannot treat the two sides symmetrically, if only because of the need to
master  the  subtleties  of  the  language  and  the  categories  it  conveys”  (Werner,
Zimmermann 2003: 15). This is even more true for a French scholar engaged in research
on a Russo-Turkish topic. Nevertheless, in one sense, the impossibility of producing a
comparative history of  the Empire may encourage pooling different historiographic
traditions, leading to a history that is no longer provincial (in the context of each of its
domains) but a regional approach in its own right (at the intersection of empires). In
this case, given sufficient energy and means, a new generation may then reconnect
with the Russica-Turcica.
 
Russia, Turkey: Comparing the comparable
21 This generation would indeed be wrong not to seek the conditions of such a dialogue,
given  so  many  objects,  closely  related  subjects  and  common  grounds  similarly
characterized by the “geographical foundations of history” (Planhol 1968). Peripheries,
borders and fronts (the Caucasus caught up in the revolutions of 1905-1906, the First
World  War  and  the  1915  Genocide)  open  and  close  a  world  of  clear-cut  barriers,
irregular mountain chains,  accessible or isolated valleys,  snowbound roads and arid
plains: all form a series of terrestrial zones to be taken into account. Not to mention the
liquid  zones  also  travelled  by  the  men and women of  “moveable  empires”  (Kasaba
2010): the Black Sea, which can be seen or not as an alter ego – in several languages and
over a long span of time; and the Mediterranean, which was a “White sea”; the Caspian
Sea, controlled by Russia after 1813, but crossed by numerous Iranian pilgrims making
their way to Istanbul in the hope of reaching the Red Sea. And everywhere you looked
bandits, merchants, nomads.
22 No  area  of  study  is  out  of  bounds,  providing  the  reflection  is  shared  around  the
plurality of  space-times,  in the continuation of the numerous imperial  comparisons
undertaken since the beginning of the 21st century – the bibliography is too rich to be
cited here.12 But this is a perilous exercise: the histories of the Russian and Ottoman
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Empires are often connected only by popular representations. Yet in reality, they are
governed  by  a  set  of  logics,  parallel  to  be  sure,  not  only  in  the  19th century  (the
emergence of autocratic régimes and modernization of institutions), but also in the 20th
century (the “nearly synchronous demises” [Reynolds 2011: 3], the revolutionary tabula
rasa, the eradication of the Empire’s élites). But these had little reciprocal influence,
even though the similarities seem to be self evident, rooted as they are in a modern
history that converges at many points.  Their geographical proximity shared Roman
heritage  and  enduring  geopolitical  rivalry  are  all  themes  that  a  priori  encourage
scholars to assume that  Russians and Turks continue to share historical experiences
and similar normative productions. 
23 Another possibility would be to look to the same sources for similar models – here their
relationship with the West immediately comes to mind. It can be said, for instance, that
if  Russians  and  Turks  learned  French,  it  is  because  they  had  “discovered”  –  an
expression used in phenomenological discourse much appreciated by Ottoman scholars
in the past century – France, and that the French had thus turned to Russia and Turkey
to “translate Asia” for them. In that case, it remains to identify the channels and means
through which knowledge and disciplines are acquired; to evaluate the roles played by
the nobility (heredity, service, land ownership) or important personages (Turkey did
not recognize aristocracies but did produce classes of nobles).13 For this, we may look to
a comparative history of cultural transfers, the risk being to elude, as often happens,
the question of the synchronicity of change, as though time-lags between cultures were
a foregone conclusion (Aymes 2015a).  Such thinking roughly goes:  it  is  logical  that
Russia adopt Western ways of thought before (and therefore to a greater extent than)
the Ottoman Empire from the moment that the Russian reformer czar (Peter the Great)
predates his Ottoman alter ego (Mahmud II, 1808-1839) by more than a century and
travelled continually throughout Europe in order to nurture the spirit of his reforms,
whereas  his  Ottoman  counterpart  had  only  met  with  European  ambassadors  in
Istanbul.
24 Comparative studies of empire, sometimes termed “imperiology”, have amply pointed
this out  (Lieven 1999):  the  dissymmetries  seem as  numerous  as  they are  clear;  the
differential relationship with the West is accepted; capacity for reform is unequal; and
the gap is never bridged. When Peter the Great resolutely took the decision to learn
from Europe, his near contemporary, Ahmed III (1703-1730), found himself unable to
impose the printing press in Istanbul. When a sultan, Abdülaziz, agreed to make his
first official trip to Europe (1867), the czars and their cousins had already had their
personal napkin rings in Europe’s best hotels for decades. While Nicolas II spoke French
like a native, Abdülhamid had to ask for translations in order to read Maurice Leblanc
and Gaston Leroux. In the Winter Palace French could be heard everywhere, whereas
almost  no  one  spoke  it  at  the  Yıldız  palace.  How  could  it  have  been  otherwise?
Knowledge of languages is a reflection of identity – O. Figes uses it as a metaphor and a
sociological indicator in his novel Natasha’s Dance (2003). The relation the two countries
entertain  with  the  West  is  ontologically  different:  Peter  the  Great  saw  himself  as
European  and  Catherine  II  came  from Europe.  No  sultan  ever  imagined  himself  as
anything other than Ottoman, nor would he have wanted to be. And the servants of the
State  resemble  their  sovereign  –  it  is  impossible  to  dispense  with  a  comparative
prosopography of elites. Russian aristocrats, educated in the course of their grand tour
of Europe, were unrivaled born-to-speak-French elites. Whereas the Turkish pashas were
often reminded of their inability to speak another language naturally (what passes for
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“naturally natural” often being simply “culturally natural”,  as Bourdieu often said);
since the (un-natural, precisely) pact between Francis I and Suleiman the Magnificent,
French had become a permanent reminder of their alliance with “the most important
Christian country of all the infernal infidel States” (Barbarossa) (Veinstein 2006: 325).
We need to find something else. And to this end, let us return to the simplest, a priori:
relations between the two States.
 
The neighboring Empire.
25 The Ottoman Empire was often at war, crippled by uprisings, ever less victorious in
battle: the theme of a pax ottomana, cultivated by the neo-Ottoman heirs to the Empire,
who turned it into a tool for dominating conquered lands, was an internal issue and as
such was often over done. Nevertheless, with regard to the rest of the world, it still
contains  its  share  of  reality:  from  the  Battle  of  Lepanto  to  Bonaparte’s  Egyptian
Expedition, no Western power was able to gain a foothold in the Ottoman territories
around the eastern shore of the Mediterranean. It should be added that, while Egypt
was a rich province, crucial to the Empire’s financial equilibrium and a pivotal piece in
its geo-strategy, it was less central to the Empire than were the countries around the
Black  Sea.  Not  to  mention  that  it  was  never  Bonaparte’s  ambition  to  permanently
subjugate the Empire or to take its capital.
26 This side trip through the Mediterranean helps shed some light on the unique position
Russia occupied on the Ottoman geo-political chessboard. For the sultan, Russia was
never  a  space  to  be  conquered  or  dominated  but  rather  a  threat  to  be  contained.
Initially a remote Moscovite principality, in the 16th century, it set out on a policy of
expansion in the North Caucasus. By the end of the 17th century, the “Empire of Russia”
extended to the edges of the Ottoman Empire (as depicted on the old maps studied by
O. Bouquet). Ottoman cartographers found it useful to draw up maps of the most recent
military maneuvers along the Ottoman, Polish and Hungarian borders. The first map
published in Istanbul in (1724-1725 (O. Bouquet) focused on the particularly threatened
Black  Sea  zone,  the  Empire’s  commercial  nerve  center  and  imagined  heart  of  its
imperial strategy.
27 Russia  and  Turkey  entertained  scientific  relations  and,  on  several  occasions,
collaborated when their interests coincided, including during times of intense conflict
(e.g.  1792-1806,  Morkva  2010).  But  Saint  Petersburg  had  their  own  –  radical  –
geopolitical plan, which was to seize control of the straits, gain access to the warm
waters,  install  Russian  Orthodoxy  at  the  heart  of  Eastern  Christianity,  ensure  the
translation of the Holy Land as Holy Russia and vice-versa (as shown in E. Astafieva’s
study of the Imperial Orthodox Palestine Society). The bigger the Russian footprint in
Iran, going as far as to hold half of the public debt, the more it distanced itself from the
Ottoman imperial economy, cut back its importation of wheat from Anatolia and the
Balkans, and reduced its investments in the railroads and mines. Why help develop a
country when the aim is to cut it in two, one victory at a time? Between 1676 and 1878,
the sultan suffered eight major military defeats in the ten wars with czarist Russia: in
this light, how could Russia not be their prime enemy? Russia’s expansionist policies
should come as no surprise. In 1869, Fuad Pacha wrote to the Sultan: “If I had been a
Russian statesman, I too would have turned the world upside down in order to capture
Istanbul”.14 Such  a  threat  needed  to  be  contained  by  heightened  vigilance  and
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redoubled diplomatic activity:  the Ottoman Empire stepped up consular missions to
Russia;  in  1900  there  were  twelve  of  them,  more  than  to  any  other  destination.15
Moreover,  this  network acted as an extension of the pan-Islamic policy pursued by
Abdülhamid II in Central Asia.
28 The emergence of steamships put the Russian navy at mere days from Istanbul. Iran,
too, bordered on Turkey; but this former enemy, with whom the Sublime Gate had not
been at war since 1823, was separated from the capital by vast plateaus, impracticable
roads and weeks on foot. Another difference between the two was that the Ottomans
were fighting their Savafid rival, which constantly threatened the Turkish territories
between the 16th and 17th centuries as well as control of the Shiite populations on the
edges of their territories, far from the capital. It was a matter of organizing military
campaigns rather than responding to quick raids: the sultan travelled to Tabriz just as
he did to Vienna. It  was often the sultan who struck the first blow. That is a third
difference: in the 18th-19th centuries, it was the czar who initiated hostilities more often
than the sultan. To wage or not to wage war: that was the question; and it frightened
and paralyzed the sultan’s administration on several occasions at the end of the 18th
century.
29 While, by virtue of its interpretation of the 1774 Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca and through
the  reality  of  its  threats  as  much as  the  weight  of  its  symbols,  Russia  became the
protector  of  Orthodox  Christians,  for  Ottomans  Russia  was  the  very  figure  of  an
intrusive empire (E. Astafieva, for Jerusalem). In 1783, Catherine the Great bathed in
the mare  nostrum.  In 1878, Russia was the first and only power in the history of the
Ottoman Empire to arrive within a few kilometers of its historical and political heart.
The trauma of the “roads to glory” (to quote the title of R. Bobroff’s 2006 book) took
new forms under the Republic. In 1946, only the American atomic umbrella kept the
Russian  navy  from crossing  the  straits.  On 9  May 2014,  Vladimir  Putin  alighted  at
Sebastopol to salute the Russian Federation’s annexation of Crimea, which he described
as a “historical” truth. Ankara immediately joined their NATO partners in condemning
the  annexation.  Turkey’s  reaction  should  be  seen  not  only  as  an  indication  of  the
importance of an enduring double historical presence (Ottomans in Crimea, Tatars in
Turkey),  it  also  points  to  the  place  occupied  by  the  geographical  face-off  in  both
Ottoman and Turkish geopolitical imaginaries. In view of the gradient of distance, the
analysis  needs to  integrate  the weight  of  the anamorphoses:  in  many respects,  the
Crimean border is closer to Istanbul than once was that of Rumelia.
 
Transfers, connections and crossings
30 For a long time, Ottoman specialists thought like Turkologists: reading documents in
Ottoman  Turkish  encouraged  them  to  look  for  the  arrival  point  of  advancing
modernity. They attempted to reconstruct the reality of a continuous but intermittent
transfer of knowledge and technology from the West. Unwittingly they anticipated the
“cultural gradient” theses, convinced as they were that the gap between East and West
was so great that successful reform was virtually impossible. Today such teleological
perspectives are contested by a great number of specialists. Clearly modernity did not
lead to Kamalism but to the AKP (Justice and Development Party), whose successive
victories  demanded to  be  read according  to  the  analytical  grids  of  modernization/
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modernism/modernity  (Bouquet 2015).  But  we  also  know  that  the  institutional
production of knowledge only partially reflects the political aims driving it.
31 Scholars now largely accept this conclusion. But several problems remain:
1/ Cultural transfer means “thinking of circulation as a subsequent step to the local
production of ‘cultures’ ”.16 Transfer is fed by a spatial and temporal lag: X is all the
more readily adopted by Y if X already has a long-standing form, and Y has long and
severely been lacking in X.
2/ Transfer is always described as based on institutions: e.g. the State council and the
Galatasaray High School, the Civil Code of laws and the 1876 Constitution. Or it is tied to
the State: it was the pachas who translated or adapted Molière and Shakespeare in the
mid 19th century.
3/ Transfer is initially a matter of crossing-over, going over to the other side – the
Hungarian  converts  (Ibrahim  Müteferrika)  or  their  French  counterparts  (Bonneval
Pacha)  were  the  introducers  of  modernity.  From the end of  the  18th century,  such
transfers were the result of an initiation experience (a stay in Paris, London or Vienna).
Transfer is a one-way street: from point of departure to point of arrival. The attempt to
create an Ottoman school in Paris in 1857 ended in failure and led to its closing in 1874.
The transfer does not then proceed in the other direction and even less in a triangular
movement (Dimitrieva, Espagne 1996).
4/ Of course, the world is more and more connected; but Ottomans connect in place, for
reasons that are a priori  obvious:  Europeans circulating throughout the Empire are
more numerous – though not all that numerous – than subjects of the sultan traveling
in Europe. If Ottoman bankers set up shop in Vienna or Paris in the second half of the
19th century, they acted less as members of the “brokering empire” than the Ottoman
merchants doing business in 16th-century Venice (Rothman 2012).  The foreign trade
figures,  which showed a deficit  throughout the 19th century, reflect this reality:  for
Ottomans, the effects of globalization were primarily centripetal.
 
Trans-acting matters and figures
32 Faced with the uncertainty stemming from unexpected documentary discoveries, the
doxographic  reflex  of  the  profession comes  out  (Boucheron 2009:  16;  Aymes  2012).
Material  has  become  available  that  was  inaccessible  some  fifteen  years  ago  (e.g.
passports or calling cards). Z. Gasimov explores them here, identifying uses of names
that differ with the context of their enunciation, mirroring a “transnational biography
navigating  between  the  Russian,  Persian  and  Turkish  worlds”.  His  investigation
involves  the  study  of  the  “technical  and  symbolic  instruments  that  circulation
produces and reproduces”. The advantage of this approach is the possibility it offers to
draw  on recent  studies  of  contemporary  revolutionary  circulation  and  on  the
connections between literature and nationalism in the Caucasus (Berberian 2012) as
well  as  to  identify  various  practices  of  self-representation.  The  aim  is  to  look  at
minorities characterized by a (no doubt growing) gap between the reduction of their
room for maneuver and the effective impact of the trans-action beyond the imperial
domain. The groups (Armenians and Tatars in particular) were clearly identified by the
public  authorities.  Other  minorities  were  less  targets  of  the  administration:  White
Russians arriving from abroad and local White Turks. The best option, of course, would
to  be  not  to  institutionalize  communities  more  than  they  actually  were  (Ottoman
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scholars  disagree  on the  use  of  the  notion of  “millet”),  and to  choose  one’s  words
calmly  while  identifying  the  practices  that  lead  to  choosing  these  words.  The  best
option would also be to avoid looking at the institutional figures through the lens of
their institutions, for instance, the university.
33 Let us take the example of the man often described as the greatest living historian of
Turkey, Halil İnalcık, whose aura is enhanced by the fact that he has just celebrated his
hundredth birthday. And let us consider him as something other than a historian. Let
us consider him as a young man, but not as a young Stalin (Montefiore 2007) or a young
Atatürk (Gawrych 2013).  Let us consider him as a young Tatar.  In this exercise,  we
forget the early signs of the great historian he would become (even if this is the case, it
would take a clever person to prove it),  who is today an honorary professor at the
University of Bilkent in Ankara. We will study him as a man shaped by language and
knowledge. We will not think about cultural transfers: in the 1950s, he studied political
science in the United States, thus becoming a historian open to the political sciences;
from 1974 he taught  at  the University  of  Chicago,  becoming a  historian capable  of
writing in English, and so on. Which leads us to think about the imperial trans-actions
of  a  man born in  1916,  who was  only 12 years  old  when he was  forced to  change
alphabets  after  having  learned  a  language  that  was  not  spoken  at  home  (Çaykara,
İnalcık 2005).
34 Next let us take the case of a historian in the following generation: born in 1947, also
from a Tatar background, İlber Ortaylı arrived in Turkey when he was a year old. At
home in  Ankara,  he  spoke  a  mixture  of  three  languages  (“karışık”,  as  they  say  in
Turkish and as he says himself17): Russian and Tatar with his parents and Turkish with
visitors. When he was five he was sent to school. There he learned to read and write
Turkish. At the age of eleven, he was sent to the Austrian high school in Istanbul. There
he learned German, which his father knew. Then for the next ten years, he studied
Persian,  French,  Italian  and  English.  He  has  not  forgotten  any  of  these  languages,
although his Russian-speaking friends say he speaks Russian a bit like a child, like the
child  he  has  in  some  ways  remained.  His  German  is  different:  he  speaks  it  as  the
language learned in the classroom and which he subsequently used with Orientalists in
Vienna. Currently as a teacher at Galatasaray high school, he usually speaks Turkish
but  which  he  sprinkles  with  all  of  his  other  languages,  oblivious  to  whether  his
interlocutor knows them or not. He speaks all these languages, but in his own way, a bit
like an old Ashkenazy uncle may speak a number of languages, but all in Yiddish. He is
the permanent site of his own translations.
35 Inalcik and Ortayli are now part of the post-globalized imperial fabric – their Wikipedia
articles  are  constantly  being  up-dated.18 But  both  have  a  common  relationship  to
empire that, while not being the outcome of Kamalist decisions in one case or of the
democratic  overtures  of  the  1950s  in  the  other,  vary  in  their  capacity,  under  the
Republic, to translate a tune heard elsewhere. Stamped with a differential historicity,
their presence may serve as a compass as we attempt to move beyond the theories of
cross-cultural translations.
 
From transfer to trans-action
36 The present issue deals with the transfer of scientific knowledge: the courses taught by
the chair of History of Turkic languages at the University of Istanbul in the 1930s were
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the outcome of a culture acquired in Bakou, Berlin and Breslau over the course of the
preceding 20 years (Z. Gasimov); at the same time, the grids of interpretation used for
Nawâ’î’s poetry in Turkey drew on the rich work of Soviet “nawa’ologists” (M. Toutant).
But in both cases, the primary issue is to identify points of passage for emic categories
(Uzbek and Turkish vocabulary ([M. Toutant], or Ottoman, Turkish and Tatar words [O.
Bouquet,  Ö.  Turesay])  in  the  literary  and  scientific  domains,  and  to  unpick  the
processes involved in the construction of  ethnic and socio-cultural  identities,  while
examining ways of presenting self and other. Comparison of notions found in travel
literature  and  geographical  annotations,  for  instance  “Northern  Turks”,  can  help
identify  cultural  or  intertextual  exchanges  between  ethnographic  imaginary  and
military  instrumentation  (Ö. Türesay,  O. Bouquet).  The  approach  via  trans-acting
matters does not necessarily run counter to the question of cultural transfer; it takes a
different tack: rather than “presuming that a domain is ‘specific’ to a region concerned,
and drawing a marquetry of incommensurable zones”, it  proposes to determine the
operational tools and methods that transform these spaces and texts. It favors relations
over  classifications.  It  identifies  spatial  “co-productions”  rather  than  national
translations (Transfaire 2012). It brings together objects and spaces, both of which are
“co-constructed” (Forestier-Peyrat 2015: 13). This can be border spaces (E. Forestier-
Peyrat),  institutional  spaces  (M.  Toutant),  built  spaces  (E.  Astafieva)  or  names  (Z.
Gasimov). It can be anything that prompts the creation of tools of appropriation and
codes of  classification.  It  can  be  seen  as  a  form  of  “methodological  materialism”
consisting in “always working from a material, documented occurrence and trying to
follow it with as few assumptions as possible about those intentions and determinations
usually imputed to ‘actors’  working with this material” (Aymes 2015b).  An example
may illustrate the difference between the two approaches: we will take the case of the
acquisition of part of the very rich library of Nikolay Katanov (1862-1922),  eminent
Turkologist at the University of Kazan, and its inclusion in the collections of Institute of
Turkish  Studies  (Türkiyat  Enstitüsü)  founded  in  1924.  These  can  be  approached  by
looking  at  the  classic  sequence  of  transfers  involved  (introduction,  reception,
diffusion);  whereas  the  inventory  and  classification  of  the  works,  establishment  of
entries for the card catalog, librarians’ annotations or comments, consultation of the
works by readers, translations and editions can be trans-acting matters. 
 
Trans-imperial, trans-local and trans-areal
37 In  preparing  this  issue,  we  wanted  to  create  a  dialogue  between  a  priori  separate
traditions (a Central Asian historian in dialogue with a Caucasus specialist; an Ottoman
specialist commenting on a paper by a Russia specialist). We were in agreement on one
point: the study of trans-imperial forms sheds light on the imperial logics involved. An
empire reaches beyond its territorial limits; it imperializes the world around it. When
this  is  already  an  imperial  world  or  is  the  target  of  a  rival  power’s  expansion,  it
becomes the territory of “shattered empires” (Reynolds 2011). This “confrontational”
dimension must be taken into account. The close analysis of translations of the same
author  into  Turkish  and  Russian  reveals  competing  strategies  of  capture  and
reappropriation,  processes  of  indigenization at  work in  literary  figures  common to
both cultures: in this sense, M. Toutant shows how the poet Nawâ’î , considered to e one
of the great Uzbek authors by the Soviet authorities,  was adopted into the Turkish
Of Turkey, Russia and Elsewhere
European Journal of Turkish Studies, 22 | 2016
14
culture as one of their own. But what we see as a disputed border can also be a space of
cross-over, production and interaction (Forestier-Peyrat 2015).
38 Empires face off. It is understandable that they are all we see, our only prism. But the
bilateral  level alone does not explain everything: to identify stages of advancement
through comparison of Russian and Turkish cartographic practices (O. Bouquet) is to
risk  neglecting  the  importance  or  the  influence  of  another  particularly  rich
cartographic  tradition  (Hewsen  2001;  Galichian  2012,  2013,  2014).  Armenian
cartography  has  a  better,  or  at  least  different,  approach  to  other  territories,  for
instance the Persian Empire, and has no doubt contributed in one way or another to
exchanges  between  the  different  traditions.  Furthermore,  the  scale  of  observation
chosen changes with the subject under study. As does the attention paid to men and
women for example. Those believed to stand on the side of the State, for instance, turn
out to be situated in another manner, as the first article in this issue, by E. Forestier-
Peyrat, shows in its analysis of consuls in the Caucasian borderland around Kars.
 
Six studies
39 E.  Forestier-Peyrier  begins  with  two  observations:  first,  that  research  on  Russian-
Ottoman  relations  has  paid  little  attention  to  the  role  played  by  borders  in  these
contacts; and second, that the Caucasus, Russia and the Ottoman Empire share a border
whose importance cannot be reduced to the geopolitical and military stakes it entails.
In a study of the countries neighboring the two empires in their final years, the author
has  been  able  to  spatialize  their  interactions  by  reconstructing  the  local  exchange
dynamics,  for  instance  on  the  occasion  of  major  political  events  such  as  the  1905
Russian Revolution. The study also encourages examining the role played by regional
actors  in  producing  relations  that  depend  more  on  a  balance  than  on  antagonism
between imperial  powers.  It  introduces  the  issue  of  time and memory  in  relations
among bordering countries,  a  central  question up to the final  moments of  the two
empires,  as  shown by  the  Ottoman occupation  of  the  western  Caucasus  in  1918.  A
“transnational,  connected history of  empires in contact” (Forestier-Peyrat  2015:  11)
should also examine the spaces between exchanges and dependences. It should identify
the crossovers in each of the spaces of production of the knowledge accumulated and
transmitted in the Caucasus and in Central Asia, but which are also connected to the
rest of the world. Z. Gasimov follows the transnational biography of a linguist across
Bakou,  Moscow,  Istanbul,  Ankara,  Kiev,  Berlin  and  Breslaw,  as  he  progressively
becomes a polyglot intellectual. 
40 Ahmed Caferoğlu (1895/9-1975) is one such figure of the post-imperial era of the 1920s,
when Azeris and Turkestanis, Tatars from Crimea and Kazan, were forced to settle in
Turkey  after  the  Bolshevik  conquest  of  the  Caucasus  and  Central  Asia.  Using
unpublished  documents,  Z.  Gasimov  set  out  to  reconstruct  the  itinerary  of  this
Azerbaijani  activist  in  exile,  trained  in  linguistics  in  Germany  and  a  pioneer  of
Turkology  in  the  1930s.  By  the  material  used  (correspondence between  colleagues,
personal papers, passports and calling cards), this transnational approach to a multi-
scale intellectual history proposes to establish a link between cultural transfers and
biographical trans-actions. The findings of this monographic study touch on ways in
which a linguist with an exceptional background that was nevertheless shared by a
post-imperial  generation  acquired  knowledge  in  the  course  of  his  travels  through
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Soviet  Russia,  Europe  and  finally  Turkey.  But  there  is  more:  in  Caferoğlu’s  case,
intellectual activity,  anti-communist commitment and university work can never be
separated. In this sense,  intellectual history opens the way to the study of political
ideologies. Providing it does not lose sight of the usefulness of a spatialized approach as
well. Thinking of the new Kemalist Turkey not only in terms of rupture or continuity
with Ottoman political society, but also as connected with migrations from the Russian
world,  demands  differentiation  of  several  contact  zones  (inter-borderlands,  intra-
borderland, between-peripheries).
41 At stake in the integration of such figures as Z. Velidi Togan or A. Caferoğlu in the
academic  sphere  is  the  competition  between Kemalist  Turkey  and Soviet  Russia  to
appropriate literary figures through developing a transnational approach to Turkology.
M.  Toutant  demonstrates  this  by  recalling  just  how Chaghatay  Turkish,  the  classic
language  spoken  by  Turkophones  in  Central  Asia,  and  the  literature  that  made  it
famous, was the object of opposing claims in Soviet Uzbekistan and Kemalist Turkey.
The  case  of  the  poet  ‘Alī  Shīr  Nawā’ī  (1441-1501)  reveals  two  competing  logics  of
reappropriation. The indigenization policy practiced by the Soviet Union transformed
‘Alī  Shīr Nawā’ī  into an “Uzbek poet” and made him a symbol of national identity.
While in Turkey, scholars motivated by nationalism approached Nawā’ī as a “Turkish
poet” and a leading representative of Turkishness. Nevertheless beyond the academic
quarrels over the ethnicity of the poet and his language, Turkish academics still relied
on  the  research  of  their  Soviet  counterparts  until  the  late  1960s.  A  transfer  of
knowledge  was  at  work  even  in  those  aspects  most  marked  by  Soviet  ideology,
continuing a history of scientific exchanges that needs to be seen in the context of the
geopolitics of modern and contemporary history.
42 O. Bouquet has chosen to use cartography to illustrate this. His study uses a corpus of
sixteen maps produced by a Russian geographic society active in the second half of the
19th century.  Each  of  these  maps  has  been  annotated  and  partially  translated  into
Ottoman  Turkish,  probably  by  the  Ottoman  military  administration.  Based  on  a
comparative approach to the Russian and Turkish schools of cartography, O. Bouquet
highlights  just  how  important  cartography  was  as  an  instrument  of  political
domination  and  a  site  of  scientific  and  technical  collaboration  between  Saint
Petersburg and Istanbul. This perspective shows how map annotations are revealing of
geographical representations as the projection of an Ottoman imaginary on the space
of a neighboring empire, a grasp of other and of self, Ottoman-centered perceptions of
the  Russian  and  Eurasian  space.  But  it  invites  another,  more  recent  approach.  If
cartography was indeed the site of specific cultural transfers, the maps studied in the
article  should also be analyzed as topographic and toponymic trans-acting matters.
They  are  not  only  instruments  for  building  standardized  codes  and  indications  of
Ottoman conceptions of geography, they are also the material outcome of an imperial
co-production.
43  But cartography is only one of the tools used to observe “the empire next door”. The
space  of  imperial  confrontations  also  obeys  a  logic  in  which  cultural  and religious
policies designed to influence the other empire are interwoven. In the second half of
the 19th century, a network of learned societies oversaw czarist Russia’s programs for
expansion into the Middle East. E. Astafieva has chosen to study two of these societies:
the Imperial Orthodox Society of Palestine and the Russian Institute of Archeology in
Constantinople,  as  a  way  of  retracing  the  formation  of  a  new  discipline,  Russian
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Palestinology. In the wake of the developing human and social sciences, scholars and
publicists have started to break down the compartementalized and confessionalized
perceptions current in 18th- and 19th-century Orientalism. Yet while accompanying the
progress  made  in  Byzantine  and  Oriental  studies,  they  also  became  the  active
instruments  –  seen  as  complementary  but  which  were  in  fact  in  competition  –  of
increased  Russian  implantation  in  Palestine.  E.  Astafieva  looks  closely  at  several
activities underway in the vicinity of the Holy Sepulcher following the acquisition of
land in  Jerusalem in  the  mid 19th century.  The  study shows how the  archeological
excavations carried out in the 1880s and the construction in Jerusalem of the Russian
Orthodox church, Saint Alexander Nevsky, signaled Russia’s appropriation of the major
symbols of Christianity and the reconfiguration of Orthodoxy in the Near East.
44 Russia’s eastern policy at the time was a challenge the sultan felt compelled to accept.
To do this,  the Imperial administration under Abdülhamid II  (1876-1909) drew up a
pan-Islamic plan of action. But the intellectual tools for such an ambition were lacking.
Ottoman scholars and journalists were more concerned with deciphering the drivers of
European expansion than discovering the vast expanse of the neighboring Empire; they
thus were slow to examine the particularities of Czarist Russia, including its school of
Turkology, as Ö. Türesay reminds us in his study. Journalist and polygraph Celâl Nuri’s
Northern  Memories (Şimâl  Hâtıraları),  published in  1912,  is  one of  the rare narratives
about travel in the last days of Czarist Russia. And even then, Celâl Nuri observed the
spaces only from the standpoint of an intellectual of his time. This is what makes the
text is so interesting. The author describes what he perceives as the deficiencies of an
autocratic model, which he compares with features of his own society. His interest in
the Empire’s Muslims leads him not only to describe the exiled Tatar populations in the
Ottoman  space  but  also  to  write  of  the  “Northern  Turks”  of  both  empires.  The
conceptual framework and the sociological types of his analysis reflect contemporary
thinking  on  the  components  of  Ottoman  identity,  thus  echoing  the  lively  debates
between Ottomanists and Turkists at the time. Once again, travel narratives prove to be
a particularly fruitful literary genre for anyone seeking to observe spatial and temporal
inter-connections and to explore representations of self and other. In the same way as
collections of correspondence and other private documents have been examined in the
present issue, analysis of travel narratives can be used to retrace processes of identity
building and to reflect on historical  experiences from a comparative,  if  not shared,
point of view.
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NOTES
1. My thanks to all those whose remarks, suggestions, bibliographical help and re-reading helped
by conceive and write the present study: Elena Astafieva, Marc Aymes, Sophie Coeuré, Étienne
Forestier-Peyrat, Zaur Gasimov et Özhan Kapıcı. 
2. My thanks to Elena Astafieva for helping me clarify some of the terminology.
3. http://monderusse.revues.org/4242.
4. Centre d’études turques, ottomanes, balkaniques et centrasiatiques.
5. XIII. Türk Tarih Kongresi. Ankara, 4-8 Ekim 1999. Kongreye Sunulan Bildiriler (2002), vol. 1, Ankara,
TTK.
6. Among  the  teaching  staff:  Ahmet  Hamdi,  author  of  a  1894  conversation  guide  (Rehber-i
mükaleme-i   lisan-i   rusi,  Istanbul,  Artin  Asaduryan ;  BOA,  Y.MTV  113/84)  and  Ahmed  Sedad,
translator of  a  shorter  Russian grammar published in  1892  and author  of  a  Russian-Turkish
dictionary that appeared in 1909 (Aykug 2006: 20).
7. BOA, DH.MKT 887/38 (7 C 1322) ; DH.MKT 1610/120 (25 B 1306).
8. It is hard to determine the exact number refugees from Russia for this period. Nur Bilge Criss
advance the number of 34,000 Russians still living in Istanbul in 1921 (1994: 54).
9. See for example Osmanlı Belgelerinde Kazan (2005) Istanbul, Devlet Arşivleri Genel Müdürluğü ;
Osmanlı Belgelerinde Kırım Hanlığı (2013) Istanbul, Devlet Arşivleri Genel Müdürluğü. 
10. https://tez.yok.gov.tr/UlusalTezMerkezi/tezSorguSonucYeni.jsp (consulté  le  4  novembre
2015).
11. A detailed inventory of the collections in military archives of the institutions hosting them as
well  as  a  presentation  of  Ottoman  printed  material  can  be  found  in  the  Russian  university
libraries in Kapıcı ; Köremezli 2012. For naval archives, see Yener 2013.
12. This was already attempted in 2009 in a seminar held at the EHESS in Paris. Researchers
working on two interconnected topics were invited to intervene on the Czar and the Sultan; the
noble  and  the  kul;  the  second  and  third  Rome;  millet and  soslovie (J.  Cadiot, O.  Bouquet,
« Ottomans et Russes, XIXe-XXe siècles : http://enseignements-2009.ehess.fr/2009/ue/966/)
13. For both cases, the reader can refer to Descimon and Haddad 2010.
14. Mehmed Galib 1910: 79. Translated from Ottoman Turkish by the author. 
15. In comparison, there were eleven in Greece, nine in Germany, seven in Romania, two in Iran
and between one and three in the nine other countries of the diplomatic network. 
16. Marc Aymes, 15 April 2015. 
17. Interview with the author, 11 November 2015.
18. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/İlber-Ortaylı et  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Halil_İnalcik
(consulted 18 May 2016). 
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